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1 Introduction
An important factor in economic decision making is the treatment of uncertainty. Knight (1921)
defines two kinds of uncertainty: risk, under which the probability of an outcome is uniquely
determined; and uncertainty, under which it is not. The latter is termed Knightian uncertainty
or deep uncertainty. In this paper, following Ellseberg (1961), we term Knightian uncertainty
ambiguity. For a survey of decision making under uncertainty, see, for example, Camerer and
Weber (1992), Etner et. al. (2012) and Guidolin and Rinaldi (2013).
We examine capital investment under ambiguity in a two-period setting. We extend the
model of Miao (2004), who investigates optimal consumption under ambiguity in a two-period
setting. We analyze a production economy and derive optimal capital investment in a general-
equilibrium setting. Suppose that there are a large number of identical consumers and firms
in an economy. For analytical simplicity, the number of consumers is equal to that of firms,
and consumers own the firms. This enables us to consider a representative consumer and firm.
The representative consumer is risk averse and has a constant absolute risk aversion utility
function. Because there is ambiguity, the representative consumer considers a set of probability
distributions. Then, we formulate the utility function as the multiple-priors expected utility
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). We formulate the central planner’s problem and derive the
optimal level of capital investment. Furthermore, we analyze the comparative static effects of
the $mo$del’s parameters. We find that ambiguity aversion and risk aversion have different effects
on capital investment. The more ambiguity averse the central planner, the higher the capital
investment. By contrast, at a low level of risk aversion, the more risk averse the central planner,
the lower the capital investment. Once risk aversion has reached a certain level, increased risk
aversion stimulates capital investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the setup of the
production economy and formulate the central planner’s problem. In Section 3, we solve the
central planner’s problem. In Section 4, we conduct a numerical analysis. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 The Model
We consider a two-period production economy. There are a large number of identical consumers
and firms. The number of consumers is equal to that of firms. The firms are owned by the
consumers and produce identical outputs. We consider a representative consumer and firm.
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The representative consumer receives an endowment $Y_{t}$ in each period $t(t=1,2)$ . This
endowment is a random variable on $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$ . The representative firm produces output by using
capital $K$ . The firm’s production function $f(k)$ is given by:
$f(k)=Ak^{\alpha}$ , (2.1)
where $A>0$ reflects the level of technology and $\alpha>0$ is the output elasticity of capital.
The consumer receives utility from consumption $C_{t}$ in each period. The utility function $u(c)$ is
assumed to be given by:
$u(c)=- \frac{1}{\theta}e^{-\theta c}$ , (2.2)
where the coefficient $\theta>0$ is the degree of absolute risk aversion. The representative con-




where $\delta\in(0,1)$ is the depreciation rate of capital. Suppose that the representative consumer
does not uniquely determine the probability distribution of future endowments but instead
considers a set of probability distributions. Then, we formulate the representative consumer’s
utility function as the multiple-priors expected utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989):
$U(C_{1}, C_{2})=u(C_{1})+ \beta\min_{\mathbb{Q}\in \mathcal{P}}\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}[u(C_{2})]$ , (2.5)
where $\beta\in(0,1)$ is a discount factor and $\mathcal{P}$ is a set of priors over $(\Omega, \mathcal{F})$ . Following Miao (2004)
and Kogan and Wang (2002), we define $\mathcal{P}$ as:
$\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{P}, \phi)=\{\mathbb{Q}\in \mathcal{M}(\Omega);\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}[\ln(\frac{d\mathbb{Q}}{d\mathbb{P}})]\leq\phi^{2}\}$ , (2.6)
where $\mathcal{M}(\Omega)$ is the set of probability measures on $\Omega,$ $d\mathbb{Q}/d\mathbb{P}$ is the Radon-Nikodym derivative
and $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}[\ln(d\mathbb{Q}/d\mathbb{P})]$ is the relative entropy index.2 This specification is based on robust control
theory.3 The parameter $\phi>0$ represents ambiguity aversion. The higher $\phi$ , the more ambiguity
averse the representative consumer,
We assume that $\mathbb{P}$ is the probability measure of the normal distribution with mean $\mu$ and
variance $\sigma^{2}$ . All probability measures in $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{P}, \phi)$ have normal distributions. $\mathbb{Q}$ is the probability
measure of the normal distribution with mean $\mu-h$ and variance $\sigma^{2}$ , where $h>0$ represents the
mean distortion chosen by the decision maker. Then, the relative entropy of $\mathbb{P}$ and $\mathbb{Q}$ is given
by:
$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}[\ln(\frac{d\mathbb{Q}}{d\mathbb{P}})]=\frac{h^{2}}{2\sigma^{2}}$ . (2.7)
The derivation of (2.7) is in Appendix A.
2This is also termed the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
3See, for example, Hansen and Sargent (2001),
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The representative firm maximizes profits, given prices and technology. We formulate the
central planner’s problem as:
$\max U(C_{1}, C_{2})$ , (2.8)
$\{C_{1},C_{2},K\}$
s.t. (2.3) and (2.4).
Rewriting the central planner’s problem yields:
$\max_{\{K\}}\{-\frac{1}{\theta}e^{-\theta(Y_{1}-K)}+\beta_{\mathbb{Q}}\min_{\in \mathcal{P}}\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}[-\frac{1}{\theta}e^{-\theta[Y_{2}+(1-\delta)K+AK^{\alpha}]}(]\}\cdot$ (2.9)
In the next section, we solve problem (2.9) and derive the optimal level of capital investment.
3 Optimal Capital Investment
In this section, we derive optimal capital investment.
From (2.9), we obtain:
$- \theta Y_{1}+\theta K=\ln\beta[(1-\delta)+\alpha AK^{\alpha-1}]-\theta[(1-\delta)K+AK^{\alpha}]+\ln(\max \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}[e^{-\theta Y_{2}}])$ . (3.1)




Substituting (3.2) into (3. 1) yields:
$- \theta AK^{\alpha}+\ln\beta[(1-\delta)+\alpha AK^{\alpha-1}]-\theta(2-\delta)K+\theta[Y_{1}-(\mu-\sqrt{2}\sigma\phi)]+\frac{\theta^{2}\sigma^{2}}{2}=0$. (3.3)
The optimal level of capital investment $K^{*}$ is derived from (3.3). Optimal consumption $C_{1}^{*}$ is
$C_{1}^{*}=Y_{1}-K^{*}$ . If the production function exhibits constant return to scale $(\alpha=1)$ , we obtain
the explicit solution:
$K^{*}= \frac{y_{1}}{2-\delta+A}+\frac{\log\beta(1-\delta+A)}{\theta(2-\delta+A)}-\frac{\mu-\sqrt{2}\sigma\phi}{2-\delta+A}+\frac{\theta\sigma^{2}}{2(2-\delta+A)}$ . (3.4)
Otherwise, it is impossible to obtain an explicit formula for $K^{*}$ . In the next section, we numer-
ically derive optimal capital investment.
4 Numerical Examples
In this section, we numerically calculate the optimal level of capital investment $K^{*}$ and inves-
tigate its response to parameter changes. The basic parameter values are as follows: $Y_{1}=10$ ;
$\delta=0.5;A=3;\alpha=0.75;\beta=0.95;\mu=5;\sigma=2;\theta=1;\phi=1$ . Given these values, optimal
capital investment $K^{*}$ is 2.767, and optimal consumption in period 1 $C_{1}^{*}$ is 7.233.
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Figures 1-5 illustrate the results of the comparative statics analysis for optimal capital invest-
ment $K^{*}$ . Figure 1 shows that although optimal capital investment $K^{*}$ is initially decreasing in
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion $\theta$ , once risk aversion has reached a certain level $(\theta=0.621$
in the base case), $K^{*}$ increases in $\theta$ . This result implies that a central planner who is barely risk
averse initially will cut capital investment once he or she becomes more risk averse. However,
once a certain level of risk aversion has been reached, the central planner’s capital investment
increases with his or her risk aversion.
Figure 2 shows that optimal capital investment $K^{*}$ is increasing in the degree of ambiguity
aversion $\phi$ . Recall that a decision maker with a higher value of $\theta$ is more averse to uncertainty.
Figure 2 implies that a central planner who is more averse to ambiguity invests more in capital.
This generates wealth in period 2.
Figure 3 shows that optimal capital investment is increasing in the volatility of endowments
$\sigma$ . Such volatility leads a central planner to invest more in capital so that the risk of having less
wealth in period 2 is avoided.
Figure 4 shows that optimal capital investment is decreasing in the technology, represented
by the parameter $A$ . Technological advance causes less capital to be needed by raising output.
Figure 5 shows that optimal capital investment is decreasing in the output elasticity of capital
$\alpha$ . This is because output increases in the output elasticity of capital.
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Figure 2: Comparative static effects of $\phi$ on optimal capital investment
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Figure 3: Comparative static effects of $\sigma$ on optimal capital investment
$0$ $25$ 5 $75$ 10
$A$










$0^{r_{)}} (_{J^{\backslash }}7_{J}^{r} 0_{J}7^{\ulcorner} 0875 7$
Figure 5: Comparative static effects of $\alpha$ on optimal capital investment
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed capital investment under ambiguity in a two-period setting. We solved
the central planner’s problem and numerically derived the optimal level of capital investment.
Comparative statics analysis revealed that ambiguity aversion and risk aversion affect capital
investment differently.
There are several ways to extend this paper. Although Figure 4 shows that capital invest-
ment is affected by technological progress, we did not consider uncertainty about technological
progress. Such uncertainty could be formulated by using the Poisson distribution. One could
also incorporate capital in addition to that used in production. For example, in cases in which
production generates pollution, there is a need to invest in environmental capital that reduces
emissions. These important topics are left to future research.
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Appendix A.
Given the assumptions about the probability measures $\mathbb{P}$ and $\mathbb{Q}$ , we obtain
$\ln(\frac{d\mathbb{Q}}{d\mathbb{P}})=\ln(\mathbb{Q})-\ln(\mathbb{P})$
$= \ln(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma})-(\frac{(y-(\mu-h))^{2}}{2\sigma^{2}})-\ln(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma})+(\frac{(y-\mu)^{2}}{2\sigma^{2}})$ ( $A$ . 1)
$= \frac{-2h(y-\mu)-h^{2}}{2\sigma^{2}}.$
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